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Integer Programming on Domains Containing
Inseparable Ordered Pairs
Francesca Busetto∗, Giulio Codognato†, Simone Tonin‡
Abstract
Using the integer programming approach introduced by Sethura-
man, Teo, and Vohra (2003), we extend the analysis of the preference
domains containing an inseparable ordered pair, initiated by Kalai
and Ritz (1978). We show that these domains admit not only Ar-
rovian social welfare functions “without ties,” but also Arrovian social
welfare functions “with ties,” since they satisfy the strictly decom-
posability condition introduced by Busetto, Codognato, and Tonin
(2015). Moreover, we go further in the comparison between Kalai and
Ritz (1978)’s inseparability and Arrow (1963)’s single-peak restrictions,
showing that the former condition is more “respectable,” in the sense
of Muller and Satterthwaite (1985).
Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: D71.
Keywords: integer programming, social welfare functions, inseparable
ordered pairs.
1 Introduction
Arrow (1963) established his celebrated impossibility theorem for Arrovian
Social Welfare Functions (ASWFs) defined on the unrestricted domain of
preference orderings. As is well known, this result holds also for ASWFs
defined on the domain of all antisymmetric preference orderings.
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Kalai and Muller (1977) dealt with the problem of introducing restric-
tions on this latter domain of individual preferences in order to overcome
Arrow’s impossibility theorem.1 They defined the notion of a decomposable
domain, and provided the first complete characterization theorem, estab-
lishing that a domain of antisymmetric preference orderings admits ASWFs
“without ties” - that is ASWFs which do not include indifference between
distinct alternatives in the range - if and only if it is decomposable.
In a later unpublished paper, Kalai and Ritz (1978) introduced the no-
tion of a domain containing an inseparable ordered pair. They showed that
such a domain must be decomposable, and consequently it always admits
nondictatorial ASWFs without ties. Domains containing an inseparable
ordered pair were studied, among others, by Kalai and Ritz (1980), Kim
and Roush ((1980),(1981)), Blair and Muller (1983), Ritz ((1983), (1985)),
Muller and Satterthwaite (1985).
More recently, in two crucial papers, Sethuraman, Teo, and Vohra ((2003),
(2006)) introduced the systematic use of integer programming in the tradi-
tional field of social choice theory, initiated by Arrow (1963). Following
their approach, Busetto, Codognato, and Tonin (2015) reformulated Kalai
and Muller (1977)’s characterization theorem; moreover, they introduced
the notion of a strictly decomposable domain, and provided a new charac-
terization theorem, establishing that a domain of antisymmetric preference
orderings admits ASWFs “with ties” - that is ASWFs including indiffer-
ence between distinct alternatives in the range - if and only if it is strictly
decomposable. They showed that a strictly decomposable domain must be
decomposable, whereas the converse relation does not hold.
In this paper, we use the integer programs formulated by Busetto et
al. (2015) to study the relationship between domains of antisymmetric
preference orderings containing an inseparable ordered pair and strictly de-
composable domains. We show that a domain containing an inseparable
ordered pair must be strictly decomposable, and consequently it always ad-
mits also ASWFs with ties; the converse relation does not hold. Moreover,
we show that, when the set of alternatives is finite, a domain of single-peaked
preference orderings a` la Arrow must contain an inseparable ordered pair
and, therefore, it is strictly decomposable. Drawing from Kim and Roush
(1980) and Muller and Satterthwaite (1985), we also deal with some ques-
tions related to measuring how restrictive are inseparability and single-peak
assumptions.
1Maskin (1979) independently investigated the same issue.
2
2 Notation and definitions
Let E be any initial finite subset of the natural numbers with at least
two elements and let |E| be the cardinality of E, denoted by n. Elements of
E are called agents.
Let E be the collection of all subsets of E. Given a set S ∈ E , let
Sc = E \ S.
Let A be a set such that |A| ≥ 3. Elements of A are called alternatives.
Let A2 denote the set of all ordered pairs of alternatives.
Let R be the set of all the complete and transitive binary relations on
A, called preference orderings.
Let Σ be the set of all antisymmetric preference orderings.
Let Ω denote a nonempty subset of Σ. An element of Ω is called admis-
sible preference ordering and is denoted by p. We write xpy if x is ranked
above y under p.
Given p ∈ Σ, let p−1 denote an antisymmetric preference ordering such
that, for each (x, y) ∈ A2, xpy if and only if yp−1x
A pair (x, y) ∈ A2 is called trivial if there are not p,q ∈ Ω such that xpy
and yqx. Let TR denote the set of trivial pairs. We adopt the convention
that all pairs (x, x) ∈ A2 are trivial.
A pair (x, y) ∈ A2 is nontrivial if it is not trivial. Let NTR denote the
set of nontrivial pairs.
According to Kalai and Ritz (1978), Ω is said to contain an inseparable
ordered pair if there exists (u, v) ∈ NTR such that, for no p ∈ Ω and t ∈ A,
uptpv.
Let Ωn denote the n-fold Cartesian product of Ω. An element of Ωn is
called a preference profile and is denoted by P = (p1,p2, . . . ,pn), where pi
is the antisymmetric preference ordering of agent i ∈ E.
A Social Welfare Function (SWF) on Ω is a function f : Ωn → R.
f is said to be “without ties” if f(Ωn) ∩ (R \ Σ) = ∅.
f is said to be “with ties” if f(Ωn) ∩ (R \ Σ) 6= ∅.
Given P ∈ Ωn, let P (f(P)) and I(f(P)) be binary relations on A. We
write xP (f(P))y if, for x, y ∈ A, xf(P)y but not yf(P)x and xI(f(P))y if,
for x, y ∈ A, xf(P)y and yf(P)x.
A SWF on Ω, f , satisfies Pareto Optimality (PO) if, for all (x, y) ∈ A2
and for all P ∈ Ωn, xpiy, for all i ∈ E, implies xP (f(P))y.
A SWF on Ω, f , satisfies Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA)
if, for all (x, y) ∈ NTR and for all P,P′ ∈ Ωn, xpiy if and only if xp′iy, for
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all i ∈ E, implies, xf(P)y if and only if xf(P′)y, and, yf(P)x if and only if
yf(P′)x.
An Arrovian Social Welfare Function (ASWF) on Ω is a SWF on Ω, f ,
which satisfies PO and IIA.
An ASWF on Ω, f , is dictatorial if there exists j ∈ E such that, for all
(x, y) ∈ NTR and for all P ∈ Ωn, xpjy implies xP (f(P))y. f is nondicta-
torial if it is not dictatorial.
Given (x, y) ∈ A2 and S ∈ E , let dS(x, y) denote a variable such that
dS(x, y) ∈ {0, 12 , 1}.
An Integer Program (IP) on Ω consists of a set of linear constraints,
related to the preference orderings in Ω, on variables dS(x, y), for all (x, y) ∈
NTR and for all S ∈ E , and of the further conventional constraints that
dE(x, y) = 1 and d∅(y, x) = 0, for all (x, y) ∈ TR.
Let d denote a feasible solution (henceforth, for simplicity, only “solu-
tion”) to an IP on Ω. d is said to be a binary solution if variables dS(x, y)
reduce to assume values in the set {0, 1}, for all (x, y) ∈ NTR, and for all
S ∈ E . It is said to be a “ternary” solution, otherwise.
A solution d is dictatorial if there exists j ∈ E such that dS(x, y) = 1,
for all (x, y) ∈ NTR and for all S ∈ E , with j ∈ S. d is nondictatorial if it
is not dictatorial.
An ASWF on Ω, f , and a solution to an IP on the same Ω, d, are said
to correspond if, for each (x, y) ∈ NTR and for each S ∈ E , xP (f(P))y if
and only if dS(x, y) = 1, xI(f(P))y if and only if dS(x, y) =
1
2 , yP (f(P))x
if and only if dS(x, y) = 0, for all P ∈ Ωn such that xpiy, for all i ∈ S, and
ypix, for all i ∈ Sc.
We define now the notion of decomposability, introduced by Kalai and
Muller (1977) to characterize the domains of antisymmetric preference or-
derings admitting nondictatorial ASWFs without ties, and the notion of
strict decomposability, introduced by Busetto et al. (2015) to characterize
the domains of antisymmetric preference orderings admitting nondictatorial
ASWFs with ties.
Consider a set R ⊂ A2. Consider the following conditions on R.
Condition 1. For all triples x, y, z, if there exist p,q ∈ Ω satisfying xpypz
and yqzqx, then (x, y) ∈ R implies that (x, z) ∈ R.
Condition 2. For all triples x, y, z, if there exist p,q ∈ Ω satisfying xpypz
and zqyqx, then (x, y) ∈ R and (y, z) ∈ R imply that (x, z) ∈ R.
4
Condition 3. There exists a set R∗ ⊂ A2, with R ∩ R∗ = ∅, such that, for
all triples x, y, z, if there exist p,q ∈ Ω satisfying xpypz and yqzqx, then
(x, y) ∈ R∗ implies that (x, z) ∈ R.
Condition 4. There exists a set R∗ ⊂ A2, with R ∩ R∗ = ∅, such that, for
all triples of alternatives x, y, z, if there exist p,q ∈ Ω satisfying xpypz
and zqyqx, then (x, y) ∈ R and (y, z) ∈ R∗ imply that (x, z) ∈ R, and
(x, y) ∈ R∗ and (y, z) ∈ R imply that (x, z) ∈ R.
A domain Ω is said to be decomposable if and only if there exist two sets
R1 and R2, with ∅ $ Ri $ NTR, i = 1, 2, such that, for all (x, y) ∈ NTR,
we have (x, y) ∈ R1 if and only if (y, x) /∈ R2; moreover, Ri, i = 1, 2, satisfies
Conditions 1 and 2.
A domain Ω is said to be strictly decomposable if and only if there exist
four sets R1, R2, R
∗
1, and R
∗
2, with Ri $ NTR, ∅ $ R∗i ⊂ NTR, i = 1, 2,
such that, for all (x, y) ∈ NTR, we have (x, y) ∈ R1 if and only if (x, y) /∈ R∗1
and (y, x) /∈ R2; (x, y) ∈ R∗1 if and only if (y, x) ∈ R∗2; moreover, Ri, i = 1, 2,
satisfies Condition 1; Ri and R
∗
i , i = 1, 2, satisfy Condition 2; each pair
(Ri,R
∗
i ), i = 1, 2, satisfies Conditions 3 and 4.
3 Domains containing an inseparable ordered pair
and nondictatorial ASWFs
Kalai and Ritz (1978) contains the first investigation of the relationship
between their notion of a domain containing an inseparable ordered pair
and Kalai and Muller (1977)’s notion of a decomposable domain. In this
section, we will extend the analysis to the relationship between the notion of
a domain containing an inseparable ordered pair and Busetto et al. (2015)’s
notion of a strictly decomposable domain. We will follow the approach -
initiated by Sethuraman et al. (2003) - which systematically applies integer
programming tools to social choice theory. In particular, we will use a
“ternary” IP on Ω proposed by Busetto et al. (2015). According to this
work, we will call it IP2. It consists of the following set of constraints:
dE(x, y) = 1, (1)
for all (x, y) ∈ NTR;
dS(x, y) + dSc(y, x) = 1, (2)
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for all (x, y) ∈ NTR and for all S ∈ E ;
dS(x, y) ≤ dS(x, z), (3)
if dS(x, y) ∈ {0, 1};
dS(x, y) < dS(x, z), (4)
if dS(x, y) =
1
2 , for all triples x, y, z such that there exist p,q ∈ Ω satisfying
xpypz and yqzqx, and for all S ∈ E ;
dS(x, y) + dS(y, z) ≤ 1 + dS(x, z), (5)
if dS(x, y), dS(y, z) ∈ {0, 1};
dS(x, y) + dS(y, z) =
1
2
+ dS(x, z), (6)
if dS(x, y) =
1
2 or dS(y, z) =
1
2 , for all triples x, y, z such that there exist
p,q ∈ Ω satisfying xpypz and zqyqx, and for all S ∈ E .
On the basis of IP2, we state and prove now our main result.
Theorem. If Ω contains an inseparable ordered pair, then there exists a
nondictatorial ternary solution to IP2 on Ω, d, for n = 2.
Proof. Suppose that Ω contains an inseparable ordered pair (u, v) ∈ NTR.
For each (x, y) ∈ NTR, let d∅(x, y) = 0, dE(x, y)=1. Moreover, let d{1}(x, y)
= 1 and d{2}(y, x) = 0, if (x, y) 6= (u, v); d{1}(x, y) = 12 and d{2}(y, x) = 12 ,
if (x, y) = (u, v). Then, d satisfies (1) and (2). Consider a triple x, y, z.
Suppose that there exist p,q ∈ Ω satisfying xpypz and yqzqx. Moreover,
suppose that d{1}(x, y) ∈ {0, 1} and
d{1}(x, y) > d{1}(x, z).
Then, (x, z) = (u, v). But then, (u, v) is not inseparable as upypv, a con-
tradiction. Now, suppose that d{2}(x, y) ∈ {0, 1} and
d{2}(x, y) > d{2}(x, z).
Then, we have d{2}(x, y) = 1, a contradiction. Therefore, d satisfies (3).
Suppose that d{1}(x, y) = 12 and
d{1}(x, y) ≥ d{1}(x, z).
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Then, we have (x, y) = (u, v). But then, we have d{1}(x, z) = 1, a contra-
diction. Suppose that d{2}(x, y) = 12 and
d{2}(x, y) ≥ d{2}(x, z).
Then, we have (x, y) = (v, u). But then, (u, v) is not inseparable as upzpv,
a contradiction. Therefore, d satisfies (4). Consider a triple x, y, z and
suppose that there exist p,q ∈ Ω satisfying xpypz and zqyqx. Moreover,
suppose that d{1}(x, y), d{1}(y, z) ∈ {0, 1} and
d{1}(x, y) + d{1}(y, z) > 1 + d{1}(x, z).
Then, we have (x, z) = (u, v). But then, (u, v) is not inseparable as upypv,
a contradiction. Now, suppose that d{2}(x, y), d{2}(y, z) ∈ {0, 1} and
d{2}(x, y) + d{2}(y, z) > 1 + d{2}(x, z).
Then, we have d{2}(x, y) = 1 and d{2}(y, z) = 1, a contradiction. Therefore,
d satisfies (5). Suppose that d{1}(x, y) = 12 and
d{1}(x, y) + d{1}(y, z) >
1
2
+ d{1}(x, z).
Then, we have d{1}(x, z) = 0, a contradiction. Suppose that d{1}(x, y) = 12
and
d{1}(x, y) + d{1}(y, z) <
1
2
+ d{1}(x, z).
Then, we have d{1}(y, z) = 0, a contradiction. Suppose that d{2}(x, y) = 12
and
d{2}(x, y) + d{2}(y, z) >
1
2
+ d{2}(x, z).
Then, we have d{2}(y, z) = 1, a contradiction. Suppose that d{2}(x, y) = 12
and
d{2}(x, y) + d{2}(y, z) <
1
2
+ d{2}(x, z).
Then, we have d{2}(x, z) = 1, a contradiction. Therefore, d satisfies (6).
Hence, d is a nondictatorial ternary solution to IP2 on Ω.
In their Theorem 4, Busetto et al. (2015) showed that there exists a
nondictatorial ternary solution to IP2 on Ω if and only if Ω is strictly de-
composable. By exploiting this result, we establish here the relationship
between the notions of a domain containing an inseparable ordered pair and
of a strictly decomposable domain as a corollary to our Theorem.
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Corollary 1. If Ω contains an inseparable ordered pair, then it is strictly
decomposable.
Proof. Suppose that Ω contains an inseparable ordered pair. Then, there
exists a nondictatorial ternary solution to IP2 on Ω, d, for n = 2, by our main
theorem. But then, Ω is strictly decomposable, by Theorem 4 in Busetto et
al. (2015).
The following example shows that the converse of Corollary 1 does not
hold.
Example 1. Let A be the closed interval [0, 1] of the real line and Ω =
{p,p−1}, where p is such that, if x, y ∈ [0, 1] and x > y, then xpy. Then,
Ω is strictly decomposable but it does not contain an inseparable ordered
pair.
Proof. Let Vi = ∅, i = 1, 2, V ∗1 = {(x, y) ∈ NTR : xpy}, V ∗2 = {(x, y) ∈
NTR : xp−1y}. Then, we have ∅ $ V ∗i ⊂ NTR, i = 1, 2. Moreover, for all
(x, y) ∈ NTR, we have (x, y) ∈ V ∗1 if and only if (y, x) ∈ V ∗2 . Finally, V ∗i , i =
1, 2, satisfies Condition 2. Therefore, Ω is strictly decomposable. Moreover,
it is straightforward to verify that Ω does not contain an inseparable ordered
pair.
Busetto et al. (2015) also proved, in their Theorem 5, that there exists a
nondictatorial ASWF with ties on a domain Ω, for any n ≥ 2, if and only if
Ω is strictly decomposable. On the basis of this result, we obtain a further
corollary of our Theorem, establishing that a domain Ω which contains an
inseparable ordered pair always admits a nondictatorial ASWF with ties,
for n ≥ 2.
Corollary 2. If Ω contains an inseparable ordered pair, then there exists a
nondictatorial ASWF with ties on Ω, f , for n ≥ 2.
Proof. Suppose that Ω contains an inseparable ordered pair. Then, it is
strictly decomposable, by Corollary 1. But then, there exists a nondicta-
torial ASWF with ties on Ω, f , for n ≥ 2, by Theorem 5 in Busetto et al.
(2015).
Kalai and Ritz (1978)’s main result, establishing the relationship between
the notions of a domain containing an inseparable ordered pair and of a
decomposable domain, is here straightforwardly obtained as a corollary of
our Theorem. The proof is based on Corollary 1 above and Busetto et al.
(2015)’s Theorem 7. This last result establishes that a strictly decomposable
domain is always decomposable.
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Corollary 3. If Ω contains an inseparable ordered pair, then it is decom-
posable.
Proof. Suppose that Ω contains an inseparable ordered pair. Then, it is
strictly decomposable, by Corollary 1. But then, it is decomposable, by
Theorem 7 in Busetto et al. (2015).
The converse of Corollary 3 does not hold. This is an immediate impli-
cation of Busetto et al. (2015)’s Example 2, showing that a decomposable
domain may not be strictly decomposable, and of our Corollary 1.
Instead, Corollary 3 has the following implication, which concerns the
existence of ASWFs without ties on domains containing an inseparable or-
dered pair.
Corollary 4. If Ω contains an inseparable ordered pair, then there exists a
nondictatorial ASWF without ties on Ω, f , for n ≥ 2.
Proof. Suppose that Ω contains an inseparable ordered pair. Then, it
is decomposable, by Corollary 3. But then, there exists a nondictatorial
ASWF without ties on Ω, f , for n ≥ 2, as is well known by Kalai and Muller
(1977)’s characterization theorem.
The next result concludes the analysis - in terms of integer programming
- of the relationships of the notion of a domain containing an inseparable
ordered pair with those of a strictly decomposable domain, and a decom-
posable domain.
Corollary 5. If Ω is decomposable but not strictly decomposable, then it
does not contain an inseparable ordered pair.
Proof. It is a straightforward consequence of our Theorem.
Muller and Satterthwaite (1985) dealt with the question of measuring
how restrictive are the various conditions imposed on a domain Ω in order
to make it to admit nondictatorial ASWFs. They suggested to use the ratio
|Ω|
|Σ| to evaluate whether “the size of [a] restricted domain is still “respectable”
relative to the size of the full domain.” They considered that a “respectable”
relative size should provide “an indication that [...] characterizations are not
very restrictive” (see pp. 154-155).
The remainder of this section is devoted to show that there exist decom-
posable and strictly decomposable domains whose size is “respectable,” if
compared to the size of the full domain, in that they contain more than half
of all possible preference orderings.
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In order to obtain these results, we first need to show the following
proposition, establishing that the minimal cardinality of decomposable and
strictly decomposable domains is |Ω| = 2.
Proposition 1. min |Ω| = 2, either for all decomposable Ω ∈ Σ and for all
strictly decomposable Ω ∈ Σ.
Proof. Consider Ω ∈ Σ and suppose that |Ω| = 1. Then, Ω is neither
decomposable nor strictly decomposable as NTR = ∅. Consider p ∈ Σ and
suppose that Ω = {p,p−1}. Let Ri = {(x, y) ∈ NTR : xpy}, i = 1, 2.
Then, we have ∅ $ Ri $ NTR, i = 1, 2. Moreover, for all (x, y) ∈ NTR,
we have (x, y) ∈ R1 if and only if (y, x) /∈ R2. Finally, Ri, i = 1, 2, satisfies
Condition 2. We have shown that Ω is decomposable. It can be easily shown
that Ω is also strictly decomposable by using, in this more general context,
the same argument as in the proof of Example 1. Hence, min |Ω| = 2, either
for all decomposable Ω ∈ Σ and for all strictly decomposable Ω ∈ Σ.
In what follows, we will also exploit the following results due to Kim and
Rousch (1980).
Consider an ordered pair (u, v) ∈ A2. Let Ω(u,v) = {p ∈ Σ : uptpv,
for some t ∈ A}. Moreover, let Ω∗(u,v) = Σ \ Ω(u,v). In their Theorem 5.2.7,
Kim and Rousch (1980) showed that, if |A| = m, |Ω∗(u,v)| = m!2 + (m −
1)!. Then, in their Theorem 5.2.8, these authors showed that the domains
containing exactly one inseparable ordered pair, whose cardinality is that
established in Theorem 5.2.7, are the largest nondictatorial domains.
Now, let H = {q ∈ Q+ : q = |Ω||Σ| , for some decomposable Ω}, where Q+
is the set of positive rational numbers. Our first result says that, if the set
of alternatives is finite, the set H has a maximum and a minimum.
Proposition 2. Let |A| = m. maxH = 12 + 1m and minH = 2m! .
Proof. Ω∗(u,v) is decomposable, by Corollary 3. Then,
1
2 +
1
m ∈ H as
|Ω∗
(u,v)
|
|Σ| =
1
2 +
1
m . |Ω| ≤ m!2 +(m−1)!, for all decomposable Ω ∈ Σ, by Theorem
5.2.8 in Kim and Roush (1980). Then, maxH = 12 +
1
m . min |Ω| = 2, for all
decomposable Ω ∈ Σ, by Proposition 1. Then, minH = 2m! .
Let K = {q ∈ Q+ : q = |Ω||Σ| , for some strictly decomposable Ω}. The
following proposition shows that also the set K has a maximum and a min-
imum.
Proposition 3. Let |A| = m. maxK = 12 + 1m and minK = 2m!
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Proof. Ω∗(u,v) is strictly decomposable, by our Theorem. Then,
1
2 +
1
m ∈ K
as
|Ω∗
(u,v)
|
|Σ| =
1
2 +
1
m . |Ω| ≤ m!2 +(m−1)!, for all strictly decomposable Ω ∈ Σ,
by Theorem 5.2.8 in Kim and Roush (1980), as each strictly decomposable
domain is decomposable, by Theorem 7 in Busetto et al. (2015). Then,
maxK = 12 +
1
m . min |Ω| = 2, for all strictly decomposable Ω ∈ Σ, by
Proposition 1. Then, minK = 2m! .
4 Domains of single-peaked preference orderings
a` la Arrow
The specific purpose of Kalai and Ritz (1978) was “to show that the single-
peak condition (see Black (1948) and Arrow (1963)) is a special case of a
simpler condition of inseparability” (see p. 1). Black (1948) and Arrow
(1963) introduced slightly different definitions of a single-peaked preference
ordering. In particular, with a view to overcome his impossibility theorem,
Arrow (1963) proposed a notion of single-peakedness which extends the one
previously introduced by Black (1948). In their Example 1, Kalai and Ritz
(1978) employed the notion of a single-peaked preference ordering a` la Ar-
row, which we remind here.
Definition. Given q ∈ Σ, p ∈ Σ is said to be single-peaked a` la Arrow
relative to q if, for all alternatives x, y, z ∈ A, xqyqz and xpy implies ypz.
Given q ∈ Σ, we denote by Ωq the set of all preference orderings which
are single-peaked a` la Arrow relative to q.
The following proposition extends a statement contained in Kalai and
Ritz (1978)’s Example 1.
Proposition 4. Given q ∈ Σ, if there are u, v ∈ A such that uqv, uqz,
vqz, for all z ∈ A \ {u, v}, or vqu, zqu, zqv, for all z ∈ A \ {u, v}, then the
ordered pair (u, v) is inseparable in Ωq.
Proof. Consider q ∈ Σ. Suppose that there are u, v ∈ A such that uqv.
Moreover, suppose that uqz, vqz, for all z ∈ A \ {u, v}. Suppose that the
ordered pair (u, v) is not inseparable in Ωq. Then, there are t ∈ A and
p ∈ Ωq such that uptpv. But we must also have that vpt, since uqvqt,
upv, and p is single-peaked a` la Arrow relative to q, a contradiction. The
case where vqu, zqu, zqv, for all z ∈ A \ {u, v} leads, mutatis mutandis, to
the same contradiction.
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In their Example 2, Kalai and Muller (1977) showed that, for any q ∈
Σ, Ωq is decomposable. Our next proposition shows that, if the set of
alternatives is finite, Ωq must also contain an inseparable ordered pair.
Proposition 5. Let |A| = m. For each q ∈ Σ, Ωq contains an inseparable
ordered pair.
Proof. There are u, v ∈ A such that uqv, uqz, vqz, for all z ∈ A\{u, v} as
|A| = m. Consider q ∈ Σ. Suppose that Ωq does not contain an inseparable
pair. Then, there are not u, v ∈ A such that uqv, uqz, vqz, for all z ∈
A \ {u, v}, by the contrapositive of Proposition 4, a contradiction. Hence,
Ωq contains an inseparable ordered pair.
The following example adapts to our context Kalai and Ritz (1978)’s
Example 2, and shows that the converse of Proposition 5 does not hold.
Example 2. Let |A| = 3. Then, Ω∗(u,v) is a domain which contains an
inseparable ordered pair but which is such that Ω∗(u,v) 6= Ωq, for each q ∈ Σ.
Proof. Let A = {a, b, c}. Consider, without loss of generality, the ordered
pair (a, c). Then, Ω∗(a,c) = {p ∈ Σ : apcpb, bpapc, bpcpa, cpapb, cpbpa}.
But then, it is straightforward to verify that Ω∗(a,c) 6= Ωq, for each q ∈ Σ.
As already mentioned, by employing his single-peak condition, Arrow
(1963) could circumvent his impossibility theorem. In Muller and Satterth-
waite (1985)’s vein, we deal with the question of measuring how restrictive
is this condition, compared with Kalai and Ritz (1978)’s inseparability con-
dition. By Kim and Roush (1980)’s Theorem 5.2.7, mentioned in Section 3,
we know that |Ωq| = 2m−1, for each q ∈ Σ. This implies that the relative
size of the domains of single-peaked preference orderings,
|Ωq|
|Σ| =
2m−1
m! , is less
“respectable” than the relative size of the domains containing exactly one
inseparable ordered pair,
|Ω∗
(u,v)
|
|Σ| =
1
2 +
1
m . In particular, when m > 3, a do-
main of single-peaked preference orderings a` la Arrow contains less than half
of all possible preference orderings. This shows that Arrow’s impossibility
theorem can be circumvented with a minor “waste” of preference orderings
by imposing Kalai and Ritz (1978)’s inseparability condition rather than the
single-peak restriction a` la Arrow.
The following corollary to Proposition 5 shows that, with a finite number
of alternatives, Ωq must be strictly decomposable.
Corollary 6. Let |A| = m. For each q ∈ Σ, Ωq is strictly decomposable.
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Proof. Consider q ∈ Σ. Suppose that Ωq is not strictly decomposable.
Then, it does not contain an inseparable ordered pair, by the contrapositive
of Corollary 1, contradicting Proposition 5.
To conclude, let us notice that Proposition 5 and the two related results
we have presented in this section no longer hold if the assumption that the
set of alternative if finite is removed. To show it, suppose that A and p
are as in Example 1. Then, it is straightforward to verify that Ωp does not
contain an inseparable ordered pair.
References
[1] Arrow K.J. (1963), Social choice and individual values, Wiley, New York.
[2] Black D. (1948), “On the rationale of group decision-making,” Journal
of Political Economy 56, 23-34.
[3] Blair D., Muller E. (1983), “Essential aggregation procedures on re-
stricted domains of preferences,” Journal of Economic Theory 30, 34-53.
[4] Busetto F., Codognato G., Tonin S. (2015), “Nondictatorial Arrovian
social welfare functions: an integer programming approach,” in Binder
C., Codognato G., Teschl M., Xu Y. (eds), Individual and collective choice
and social welfare: essays in honor of Nick Baigent, Springer-Verlag,
Berlin Heidelberg.
[5] Kalai E., Muller E. (1977), “Characterization of domains admitting non-
dictatorial social welfare functions and nonmanipulable voting proce-
dures,” Journal of Economic Theory 16, 457-469.
[6] Kalai E., Ritz Z. (1978), “An extended single peaked condition in social
choice,” Discussion Paper n. 325, Center for Mathematical Studies in
Economic and Menagement Science, Northwestern University.
[7] Kalai E., Ritz Z. (1980), “Characterization of the private alternatives
domains admitting Arrow social welfare functions,” Journal of Economic
Theory 22, 23-36.
[8] Kim K.H., Roush F.W. (1980), Introduction to mathematical theories of
social consensus, Dekker, New York.
13
[9] Kim K.H., Roush F.W. (1981), “Effective nondictatorial domains,” Jour-
nal of Economic Theory 24, 40-47.
[10] Maskin E. (1979), ”Fonctions de pre´fe´rence collective de´finies sur des
domaines de pre´fe´rence individuelle soumis a` des constraintes,” Cahiers
du Se´minaire d’Econome´trie 20, 153-182.
[11] Muller E., Satterthwaite M.A. (1985), “Strategy-proofness: The exis-
tence of dominant-strategy mechanisms,” in Hurwicz L. Schmeidler D.,
Sonnenschein H. (eds), Social goals and social organization: essays in
memory of Elisha Pazner, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
[12] Ritz Z. (1983), “Restricted domains, Arrow social welfare functions and
noncorruptible and nonmanipulable social choice correspondences: the
case of private alternatives,” Mathematical Social Sciences 4, 155-179.
[13] Ritz Z. (1985), “Restricted domains, Arrow social welfare functions
and noncorruptible and nonmanipulable social choice correspondences:
the case of private and public alternatives,” Journal of Economic Theory
35, 1-18.
[14] Sethuraman J., Teo C.P., Vohra R.V. (2003), “Integer programming
and Arrovian social welfare functions,” Mathematics of Operations Re-
search 28, 309-326.
[15] Sethuraman J., Teo C.P., Vohra R.V. (2006), “Anonymous monotonic
social welfare functions,” Journal of Economic Theory 128, 232-254.
14
